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Abstract 
The threat of terrorist attacks motivates emotional reactions which elicit functional 
behavioral responses to characteristics of a threatening group.  We argue that anger 
arises the more the group is seen as unjust, whereas fear arises the more it is seen as 
powerful.  In Experiment 1, British participants read about terrorist groups with varied 
levels of injustice and power.  As expected, the manipulation of injustice increased 
anger, and power increased fear.  Anger and fear both predicted offensive and 
defensive reactions.  Experiment 2 used a representative sample of US residents and 
again found distinct effects of an injustice manipulation on anger, and a power 
manipulation on fear.  Anger was a primary motivator of support for both offensive 
and defensive measures in both experiments.  Willingness to negotiate was reduced 
with more injustice and anger, but increased with more outgroup power and fear.  
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Angry at the Unjust, Scared of the Powerful:  Emotional Responses to Terrorist 
Threat 
 
International terrorism has become both a realistic and symbolic threat (see 
Crowson, 2009) that lingers daily over people’s lives.  Research has shown that 
making a specific, imminent, terror threat salient increases concern for homeland 
security (Willer & Adams, 2008), while changes to terror threat levels increase 
support for leadership (Willer, 2004).  Thus, even without an actual enacted attack, 
threats of terrorism can play an important role in intra- and intergroup processes. And 
emotional responses to this kind of threat can give important insights into how people 
handle threatening outgroups in general. 
Our research investigates how specific aspects of threatening terrorist groups 
elicit the emotional reactions of anger and fear, and corresponding behavioral 
intentions.  Overall, we see two aspects of the larger construct of “threat” as being 
particularly important in distinguishing anger from fear. First, the extent to which a 
threatening group is seen as unjust – that is, acting intentionally and without 
provocation – is one aspect of threat that principally influences feelings of anger. 
Second, the amount of power the group is seen as having is another aspect of threat 
that principally influences fear.  Whereas previous research has investigated the role 
that emotional reactions to terrorist attacks play in eliciting retaliatory behavior, we 
investigate how threatening foreign groups, as read in the news or implied through 
terror threat warnings, elicit pre-emptive behavioral intentions to engage, confront, or 
avoid the threat. 
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Threat appraisals and emotion 
It is now well established that people can feel emotions in response to groups 
that threaten the well-being of their own group (Mackie & E. R. Smith, 2002).  Some 
approaches to the study of group-based emotion have investigated reactions to 
specific intergroup interactions, exploring how social categorization and identification 
(see Dumont, Yzerbyt, Wigboldus, and Gordijn, 2003), or appraisals of specific 
intergroup events impact emotional experiences (see Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000). 
Other approaches have investigated how more stable perceptions of intergroup 
relationships influence the emotions people feel toward outgroups (see Cottrell & 
Neuberg, 2005; Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2007).  Cuddy et al. (2007), for example, 
investigated how another group’s general intentions (helping or harming; competing 
or cooperating) and ability to enact those intentions (status or power) elicit stable 
stereotypes, emotional reactions, and behavioral intentions.   
Most research that has investigated group-based emotional reactions to 
terrorism has investigated how anger and fear in response to specific terrorist attacks 
elicit specific behavioral consequences.  Less research has investigated what elicits 
those emotional reactions and intended responses in the absence of an enacted threat.  
Like Cuddy et al. (2007), we contend that when a threat is impending rather than 
enacted – when there is no specific event to appraise – individuals are likely to 
appraise stable characteristics of a group whose existence has negative consequences 
for the ingroup’s interests.  These appraisals should impact both emotional reactions 
and behavioral intentions. 
Anger and injustice. Theorists as far back as Aristotle have recognized the 
role of perceived injustice in the elicitation of anger.  Aristotle claimed that anger was 
“a longing, accompanied by pain, for a real or apparent revenge for a real or apparent 
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slight, affecting a man himself or one of his friends, when such a slight is 
undeserved.” (1926, p. 173).  Anger has been shown to respond to perceptions of 
unfairness (Ellsworth & C. A. Smith, 1988; Roseman, Spindel, & Jose, 1990), and 
indeed, people most commonly respond to injustice with feelings of anger (Clayton, 
1992; Mikula, Scherer, & Athenstaedt, 1998).  A recent meta-analysis, too, shows that 
anger plays a key role in reactions to injustice, motivating support for collective 
action (van Zomeren, Postmes & Spears, 2008).  Likewise, research in the intergroup 
domain has shown a connection between anger and the perception of a group’s 
actions as intentional and unfair, in contexts such as international aggression and 
academic politics (e.g., Gordijn, Wigboldus & Yzerbyt, 2001; Yzerbyt, Dumont, 
Wigboldus, & Gordijn, 2006).   
In general, perceptions of injustice are an important component of threat 
because they add information to that provided by assessments of the group’s raw 
power to achieve its goals. A group that acts unjustly against one’s own group shows 
itself to be without moral restraint, either internal or external. Regardless of its power, 
it is likely to prove a persistent threat. Justice, however, is a multifaceted construct, 
perceptions of which can be influenced by a variety of factors.   
One factor which increases perceptions of injustice is intent.  Miller (2001), 
for example, links the malicious intent underlying an offense to the extent to which it 
is perceived as unjust, and therefore the extent to which it elicits anger.  Likewise, 
moral judgments often involve blame and culpability, which in turn rest on 
intentionality (Weiner, 1995; Quigley & Tedeschi, 1996). Several neuroscience and 
developmental studies have linked intentionality judgments to fairness concerns (e.g., 
Güroğlu, van den Bos et al., 2011; Castelli, Massaro, Sanfey & Marchetti, 2010). 
Other recent research has shown anger, unlike disgust, to respond to an agent’s 
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intentionality in a moral judgment (Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2011).  This suggests 
that if a group is appraised as posing an intentional threat, it will be appraised as 
unjust and anger may arise as a functional motivator to ward off attack through any 
means necessary.  
Provocation has also been linked to justice perceptions, with harmful actions 
that are seen as a response to provocation being perceived as more justified (e.g., 
Tedeschi, Smith, & Brown, 1974).  If a group’s hostility has been provoked, it may be 
seen as more justified in its threat, and anger may be reduced accordingly.  
Fear and power. H. T. Smith, Cronin, and Kessler (2008), in a correlational 
study, found that injustice and intentionality-related appraisals best predicted anger in 
a collective pay dispute, while assessments of ingroup coping potential best predicted 
fear.  In fact, a number of empirical studies (e.g., Roseman, Antoniou & Jose, 1996; 
Scherer, 1997) have shown that fear corresponds to a perception that one has low 
coping potential for dealing with a negative situation.  When an assessment of coping 
potential is focused on a threatening group, it is most important to find out how much 
power the group has to enact its threat.  Thus we argue that the more ability a group 
has to enact its threat – the more power, resources, and support it has – the more it 
will instill fear in relevant outgroups.  A threatening group is, after all, one which can 
cause harm to my group.  One which also has power and resources is significantly 
more likely to be able to do so. 
Emotions and Behavioral Reactions to Threats 
Research investigating reactions to terrorism has shown that both anger and 
fear results from terrorist attacks, and that the two emotions are somewhat correlated 
(see Skitka, Bauman, & Mullen, 2004).  Cheung-Blunden and Blunden (2008) 
showed that anger mediates the effect of many terrorism-related attitudes on support 
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for war, post September 11
th
.  Likewise, Sadler, Lineberger, Correll, and Park (2005) 
showed that people who responded to terrorist attacks with anger endorsed an 
aggressive military response, blaming the September 11
th
 attacks on fanaticism and 
poor security.  In contrast, people who experienced more fear were uncomfortable 
with the idea of strong military responses (see Sadler et al., 2005).  This fits with the 
findings of Skitka, Bauman, Aramovich, and Morgan (2006), whose U.S. participants 
post-September 11
th
 supported aggressive action against terrorists the more anger they 
felt, and defensive actions against them (e.g., expulsion from the country) the more 
fear they felt.  
Thus it seems that in response to terrorist attacks, anger elicits aggressive 
responses, whereas fear elicits a desire to avoid the terrorist group.  However, Skitka 
et al. (2004) found that both anger and fear elicited political intolerance, although they 
did so through different pathways.  In addition, other evidence from studies of 
intergroup emotions shows that anger can also be associated with avoidant responses 
(Yzerbyt et al., 2003; Plant, Butz & Tartakovsky, 2008), and fear with aggressive 
ones (Spanovic, Lickel, Denson & Petrovic, 2010).  Therefore, the fear-avoidance and 
anger-aggression links are not universally supported at the intergroup level.   
Maitner, Mackie, and Smith (2006) argued that enacting an emotionally-
motivated behavioral intention (e.g., aggressing against a terrorist group when feeling 
anger) regulated emotional reactions (e.g. reducing anger) by effectively eliminating 
the underlying threat.  Thus, we argue that characteristics of a lingering threat may 
largely determine how individuals will want to behave.  Because our work 
investigates how emotions elicit behaviors aimed at preventing – rather than reacting 
to – attacks, we anticipated that characteristics of the threat would influence which 
behaviors could functionally reduce threat.  We explored how perceptions of the 
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injustice and power of terrorist groups, and resulting anger and fear, influenced 
desires to engage, avoid, or confront threatening groups.  In the context of a threat that 
has not been enacted,  as opposed to one that has, any characteristics of a group that 
increase the likelihood that it would attack (power and injustice) might increase both 
defensive (i.e. avoidant) and offensive (i.e. confrontational) responses via the 
mediators of anger for injustice, and fear for power.  However, negotiation is likely to 
be affected differently. If a group is seen as unjust, it is unlikely to play fair in 
negotiation, so these perceptions should work against support for negotiation, via the 
mediator of anger. Power and fear, if anything, may work to increase support for 
negotiation, increasing the perceived importance of the threat. 
Present Research 
This paper reports two experiments in which threatening group types were 
presented as having characteristics related to injustice and power.  We predicted that 
when another social group is perceived as presenting a threat to the ingroup, fear will 
be predicted by the threatening group’s perceived power, and anger will be predicted 
by perceived injustice in the threatening group’s intent.  We further predicted that 
while perceptions of both power and injustice would independently increase 
perceptions of overall threat, specific aspects of the threat would be related to specific 
emotional reactions.  We then explored how these characteristics influenced 
preventative intergroup behaviors. 
Experiment 1 establishes the causal impact of these appraisals on emotions.  In 
this experiment, British participants read descriptions of terrorist groups, ostensibly 
compiled by the intelligence agency MI5.  We manipulated perceived injustice by 
varying the group’s intent to cause harm, as well as manipulating the power ascribed 
to these groups.  We then measured emotional reactions as well as approach and 
ANGER AND FEAR TOWARD TERRORISM  9 
 
avoidance intentions.  In Experiment 2, a nationally representative sample of 
American citizens again read descriptions of threatening groups that varied in levels 
of injustice and power, and rated their support for negotiation with the group in 
addition to the variables measured in Experiment 1.   
EXPERIMENT 1 
METHOD 
Participants and Design 
 Participants were 60 students of British nationality at the University of Kent 
who participated in exchange for course credit.  Participants were randomly assigned 
to the cells of a 2 (Injustice: low versus high) x 2 (Power: low versus high) between-
subjects design. 
Procedure 
 Participants came into the laboratory to participate in a study investigating 
perceptions of terrorism.  They read a short article ostensibly taken from the BBC 
News website about the terrorist threat facing the UK.  Care was taken to ensure the 
psychological impact of the manipulations by modeling the presentation style of 
bbc.co.uk, including a “page last updated” date and time, an annotated image, and an 
actual quote by (at the time) Home Secretary Jacqui Smith: “We now face a threat 
level that is severe.  It’s not getting any less, it’s actually growing.  The number of 
organizations and plots being monitored globally has increased dramatically over the 
past two years.” (BBC News Online, April 13, 2006).   
 Participants next learned that “although most terror groups have a goal of 
reducing Western influence in their homelands, organizations vary widely in their 
size, access to resources, and behavioral goals.”  Participants were told that analysts 
within MI5 had categorized hundreds of organizations into a few general types, and 
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that they would be asked to evaluate some groups that “pose an imminent threat to 
British interests.” 
 Injustice manipulation.  In this study, we manipulated the injustice of the 
threat by modifying the intent underlying the group type’s ideology.  Participants read 
either the high injustice condition phrases – “these groups have a strong interest in 
causing harm to any Western interests either at home or abroad.  These groups 
actively seek to harm individuals or organizations with ties to Western governments 
or organizations” – or the low injustice condition phrases – “this type of group tends 
to have little interest in causing direct harm to Western individuals or interests.  
Although their focus is not on harming westerners, this group type’s actions 
ultimately have devastating consequences for Western individuals and businesses.” 
 Power manipulation. Next, participants read either the high power condition 
phrases –“[t]his group type is comprised of groups with large numbers of wealthy 
members, and good access to finances and weapons” or the low power condition 
phrases – “[t]hese types tend to be small groups of poorer guerrilla fighters, with 
fewer resources to serve their harmful goals.” 
 Emotions. Participants were next asked to indicate, as a British citizen, the 
extent to which they felt a variety of emotional responses toward their group type 
using 7-point Likert-type scales (1 = Not at all, 7 = Very much).  Out of these 18 
responses, which included measures of disgust, hatred and confusion, we focused on 
the theoretically relevant constructs of anger and fear.  We analyzed participants’ 
response of anger toward (angry at, rage at, frustrated by, furious at, irritated by, and 
outrage toward,  = .93) and fear of (frightened of, fearful of, scared of, afraid of1,  
= .94) the presented group type.  These scales were correlated at r = .44, p < .001. 
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 Behavioral Intentions. Participants then reported on similar scales the extent 
to which they wanted to aggress against (be verbally aggressive toward, retaliate 
against, punish, and be physically aggressive towards,  = .82) and avoid (stay away 
from, reject, distance myself from, and avoid,  = .86) the group type.  These two 
intentions were correlated, r = .34, p = .008. 
Appraisals and threat evaluation. Four items using similar 7-point scales 
assessed perceptions of general threat: “This group type is a danger to my group,” 
“This group type is of no great concern to my group” (reversed), “I think this group 
type is damaging as a whole”, “This group type is harmful to my group,” ( = .87). 
Four items measured appraisals of intent:“This group type operates with clear goals in 
mind,” “This group type’s actions are unplanned” (reversed), “This group type carries 
out actions unknowingly” (reversed), “This group type’s actions are deliberate” ( = 
.70). Four more such items assessed power: “This group type will have a significant 
impact on my group,” “My group will be unaffected by this group type” (reversed), 
“My group will be unaffected by this group type” (reversed), “This group type is 
influential on my group” ( = .76). Finally, four more items assessed the injustice of 
the group’s actions ( “This group type is acting outside their rights in society,” “This 
group type has good reason for doing what they do” (reversed), “This group type is 
justified in what they do ,” (reversed), “This group type’s behavior is inexcusable”,  




  Threat.  A 2 × 2 GLM analysis of participants’ threat appraisals revealed 
main effects of both injustice, F (1, 56) = 14.03, p < .001, 2p = .20, and power, F (1, 
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56) = 20.15, p < .001, 2p = .27, with no significant interaction.  Both manipulated 
factors influenced perceptions of threat as intended, in an additive fashion; these 
effects were roughly equivalent in size.  Participants in the high injustice condition 
perceived more threat (M = 5.08, SD = 1.02) than participants in the low injustice 
condition (M = 4.07, SD = 1.35).  Likewise, participants in the high power condition 
perceived more threat (M = 5.18, SD = 1.14) than participants in the low power 
condition (M = 3.97, SD = 1.15).  In other words, power and injustice seem to 
represent two independent sources of social threat.  
Power. To check the power manipulation, power appraisal scores were 
subjected to a 2 (Injustice) × 2 (Power) ANOVA.  Analysis revealed only the 
predicted main effect of the power manipulation, F (1, 56) = 18.54, p < .001, 2p = 
.25.  The high power condition led to perceptions of more power (M = 4.70, SD = 
0.98) compared to the low power condition (M = 3.56, SD = 1.05).  
Injustice. A similar analysis of injustice appraisals revealed only a main effect 
of injustice manipulation, F (1, 56) = 10.34, p = .002, 2p = .16.  Participants 
perceived group types with high injustice to be more unjust (M = 5.64, SD = 1.04) 
than group types with low injustice (M = 4.78, SD = 1.03).  The effects of power and 




 To investigate the experimental effects of injustice and power on participants’ 
anger and fear, emotions were subjected to 2 (Injustice) × 2 (Power) GLM analyses. 
Each analysis controlled for the other emotion as a covariate because of the 
correlation between anger and fear, as already noted. 
Anger. Analysis of anger controlling for fear revealed an effect of the 
covariate, F (1, 55) = 8.62, p = .005, 2p = .14, and the predicted main effect of 
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injustice, F (1, 55) = 5.11, p = .03, 2p = .09.  Participants in the high injustice 
condition reported more anger (adj. M = 4.64, SE = 0.26) than participants in the low 
injustice condition (adj. M = 3.78, SE = 0.26).  The main and interactive effects of 
power were not significant, both F (1, 55) < 1, p > .40, 2p < .02. 
Fear. Analysis of fear controlling for anger revealed an effect of the covariate, 
F (1, 55) = 8.62, p = .005, 2p = .14, as well as the predicted main effect of power, F 
(1, 55) = 10.85, p = .002, 2p = .17.  As expected, participants in the high power 
condition reported more fear (adj. M = 4.51, SE = 0.24) than participants in the low 
power condition (adj. M = 3.39, SE = 0.24).  Neither the main effect of injustice nor 
the Power x Injustice interaction was significant, both F < 2.25, p > .10, 2p =.04. 
Behavioral Intentions 
 Next, we subjected behavioral intentions to 2 (Injustice) × 2 (Power) ANOVA. 
Aggression. Aggressive intentions showed a main effect of injustice, F (1, 56) 
= 6.48, p = .01, 2p = .10.  Participants in the high injustice condition reported more 
desire to aggress (M = 3.59, SD= 1.19) than in the low injustice condition (M = 2.75, 
SD = 1.33).  The main and interactive effects of power were not significant, both F < 
1, p > .77.   
Avoidance. Analysis of avoidance intent also revealed a main effect of 
injustice, F (1, 56) = 6.19, p = .02, 2 = .10.  Participants in the high injustice 
condition reported more desire to avoid (M = 5.33, SD = 0.86) than participants in the 
low injustice condition (M = 4.43, SD = 1.76).  The main and interactive effects of 
power were again not significant, F < 1,  p > .50.   
Relations Among Appraisals, Emotions, and Behaviors 
To clarify how emotions responded to perceptions of power, intent, and 
injustice, we ran regression analyses collapsing across conditions and predicting the 
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emotion variables from appraisals of power, intent, and injustice, controlling for the 
other emotion as before; both emotions were significant predictors of the other.  
Anger was predicted only by perceived injustice of the group’s actions ( = .43, p < 
.001) and not by any other appraisal (both p > .30).  Fear was predicted only by 
perceived power of the group ( = .47, p <.001) and not by any other appraisal (both p 
> .30).  
We also ran regression analyses collapsing across conditions and predicting 
the behavioral intention variables simultaneously from anger, fear, and appraisals of 
power, intent, and justice.  Aggressive intention was predicted by feelings of anger ( 
= .50, p < .001) and by injustice ( = .29, p = .02).  No other predictors were 
significant (all p > .28).  Likewise, avoidance intention was predicted by feelings of 
anger ( = .52, p < .001) and marginally by injustice ( = .23, p = .07).  No other 
predictors were significant (all p > .55).   
Finally, we ran mediation analyses using the PROCESS bootstrapping macro 
for SPSS (Hayes, in press), with 5000 resamples, testing anger and fear as mediators 
between each of our manipulations (coded 0 for low and 1 for high) and each of our 
outcomes (aggressive and avoidant intention).  As with our other analyses, we 
included as a covariate the emotion not being used as a mediator, and also covaried 
out the manipulation not being studied in the analysis.  
These analyses are presented in Figure 1, with the total zero-order effect of 
manipulation of outcome broken down into direct effect and indirect effect via the 
mediating path, and all three of these coefficients for each of the eight analyses 
presented in a grid below the illustration.  The only significant mediating path 
between a manipulation and behavioral intention outcome was between the injustice 
manipulation and aggressive action tendencies, via anger.  To test an alternative 
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mediation model, we also ran similar analyses with the same variables, but with 
mediator and outcome switched, so that action tendencies were tested as mediators 
and emotions as outcomes, and controlling for the other actions and the other contrast. 
However, none of these yielded a significant indirect path, all CI including zero. 
DISCUSSION 
 These results provide initial support for the idea that, in response to looming 
threat, anger emerges from perceptions of injustice, whereas fear emerges from the 
power a group has to cause us harm.  But, in contrast to findings from some previous 
research, we found that anger was related to intentions to both confront and avoid a 
threatening group, although it only mediated between the injustice manipulation and 
confrontational intentions.  In contrast, fear was unrelated to both intentions.  We will 
give a fuller reflection on these findings in our Discussion of Experiment 2. 
EXPERIMENT 2 
 Our second experiment was conducted on a nationwide online sample in the 
United States as part of the Timesharing Experiments in the Social Sciences (TESS) 
program, using a research panel sample representative of the US population 
maintained by Knowledge Networks, Inc.  By using a general-population sample, we 
hoped to overcome the well-known limitations inherent in using a student sample, 
including lack of representativeness, greater awareness of psychological theory, and 
more liberal attitudes than the general population (Sears, 1986).  
 In Experiment 2, we also added a more sophisticated manipulation of 
perceived injustice.  Modifying the intention-based manipulation of injustice in 
Experiment 1, we added an intermediate level in which harm was intentional but was 
a response to provocation.  Participants in a “high injustice” condition learned that the 
target group wished to harm the US intentionally, without provocation; in a “moderate 
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injustice” condition, the target group wished to harm the US intentionally, but in 
revenge for what it saw as the past exploitation by the US; finally, in a “low injustice” 
condition, the target group harmed the US, but unintentionally.   
Our Experiment 1 found that only injustice and anger predicted both 
aggressive and avoidant intentions toward impending threat, unlike previous studies 
of enacted terrorist violence (i.e. Skitka et al., 2006).  In Experiment 2, we represented 
behavioral intentions with items more similar to those in other research, asking for 
specific national-level policy recommendations rather than general action intentions. 
We also used this opportunity to assess a new behavioral intention: negotiation with 
the threatening group.  Negotiation is a policy option not previously assessed in the 
literature on emotion and terrorism, to our knowledge.   
The international relations literature suggests two considerations concerning 
negotiation with terrorist groups (e.g., Bapat, 2006; Pruitt, 2006).  First, if negotiation 
is seen as dealing with people who unjustly wish destruction on one’s own nation, it 
may be categorically excluded as an immoral and foolish option.  For this reason, we 
supposed that negotiation would be a less favored option the more unjust the terrorist 
group’s cause, and the more anger felt towards it.  Second, negotiation is a pragmatic 
measure often resorted to when a group is doing harm but is otherwise hard to 
influence.  Because of this, it was possible that greater power ascribed to a terrorist 
group, and greater fear about it, might underlie greater support for negotiation.  
METHOD 
Participants and design. Participants were 1072 United States citizens who 
were members of a Knowledge Networks research panel, forming a weighted 
stratified sample representative of the US population (for further details see 
Knowledge Networks, Inc., 2011).  The questionnaire was administered online, and 
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the completion rate was 63.6% (that is, 1685 participants started the questionnaire), a 
rate comparable to the typical TESS completion rate of 65% (Freese, 2010).  Among 
completed surveys, 52.1% of respondents were male, and 72.9% identified as White 
non-Hispanic, 8.7% as Black non-Hispanic, 10.7% as Hispanic, and 7.8% as other or 
multiple race, non-Hispanic.  The mean age was 48.78 (SD = 17.08). 
Procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to one of 6 conditions of our 
3 (Injustice: low, medium, or high) × 2 (Power: low or high) design.  As in 
Experiment 1, participants were asked to read a vignette describing a type of group, 
then report their opinions and judgments. 
Injustice manipulation. In the low injustice condition, the group was 
described as harming US interests unintentionally: “These groups have little interest 
in directly harming American interests either at home or abroad.  They are driven by 
their own interests, and don’t seem to worry about America.  Even though their focus 
is not on harming Americans, these groups’ violent actions have very negative 
consequences for American people and businesses.”  
In the moderate injustice condition, the group was described as acting 
intentionally against the US, but with provocation, in revenge for perceived US 
injustice against its country: “These groups have a strong interest in harming 
American interests either at home or abroad.  They are driven by revenge, and believe 
that their country has been exploited by American companies and governments.  
These groups actively try to harm people or organizations with ties to America.” 
In the high injustice condition the animosity against the US was described as 
both intentional and without provocation: “These groups have a strong interest in 
harming American interests either at home or abroad.  They are driven by hatred, and 
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believe that America is evil and should be eliminated from the face of the earth.  
These groups actively try to harm people or organizations with ties to America.” 
Power manipulation. In the rest of the paragraph, participants in the low 
power condition learned that “[t]hese groups have few friends even within their own 
country, and tend to be small in size.  They have almost no access to money or 
weapons.”  Participants in the high power condition learned that “[b]acked by rich and 
well connected friends, these groups tend to be large in size.  They have nearly 
limitless access to money and weapons.” 
Dependent variables. Participants reported appraisals, emotions, and 
behavioral intentions in a blocked random order.  They reported, as an American, how 
angry (angry, furious, outraged;  = .95) and afraid (afraid, fearful, worried;  = .93) 
they felt about the group using 7-point Likert-type scales anchored at 1 = “Not at all” 
and 7 = “Very much”.  As in Experiment 1, these two factors were correlated, r = .67, 
p < .001.   
Participants also reported appraisals of intent (“This type of group has clear 
goals to harm the USA,” “This type of group’s actions against the USA are not 
planned” (reversed), “This type of group’s actions against the USA are deliberate;”  
= .82), provocation ( “This type of group was provoked into harming the USA,” “This 
type of group has no reason for acting against the USA” (reversed), “This type of 
group is responding to the actions of the USA;”  = .51), injustice (“This type of 
group is acting outside their rights,”“This type of group is acting fairly” (reversed), 
”This type of group is committing injustice;”  = .74), and power (“This type of 
group is strong,” “This type of group is influential,” “This type of group is not very 
powerful” (reversed);  = .79).  Each appraisal was measured with three-item Likert 
scales anchored at 1 = “Strongly disagree” and 7 = “Strongly agree.”   
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Behavioral intentions were measured with 2-item Likert scales in the same 
format.  Participants reported support for aggression (“The USA should send troops to 
attack this type of group” and “The USA should spend money to fight this type of 
group’s influence;” r =.59, p < .001), defensive measures representing avoidant 
responses (cf. Skitka et al., 2006;  “The USA should deport anyone who supports this 
type of group from America” and “The USA should spend money to increase security 
against this type of group;” r =.47, p < .001), or negotiation (e.g., “The USA should 
make a deal with this type of group” and “The USA should try to talk this group type 
out of harming America;” r =.31, p < .001). 
RESULTS 
Appraisals 
As manipulation checks, participants’ appraisals were subjected to 2 (Power) 
× 3 (Injustice) ANOVAs.  Data for all cell means can be seen in Table 1. 
Power. As expected, perceptions of power were strongly affected by the 
manipulation of power, F (1, 1056) = 359.38, p < .001, 2p = .25.  Participants in the 
low power condition judged that the target group had less power (M = 3.73, SD = 
1.32) than participants in the high power condition (M = 5.11, SD = 1.06).  There 
were also significant effects of the injustice manipulation, F (2, 1056) = 10.24, p < 
.001, 2p = .02, and the Power × Injustice interaction, F (2, 1056) = 5.20, p = .006, 
2
p 
= .01.  Analysis of the effect size, however, reveals that these latter effects were much 
weaker than the effect of the power manipulation, by more than a factor of 10. 
Because of the unusually high experimental power afforded by our sample, which 
allows even very weak effects to appear as significant, effect size is a more 
appropriate criterion than significance by which to judge the relative effects of our 
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manipulations (Cohen, 1994).  By this standard, the manipulation of power had the 
desired effect. 
Injustice. Also as expected, participants’ perceptions of injustice were 
significantly affected by the manipulation of injustice, F (2, 1053) = 85.18, p < .001, 
2p = .14.  Participants in the low injustice condition said that the target group was 
less unjust (M = 4.87, SD = 1.09) than participants in the moderate injustice (M = 
5.73, SD = 1.08, Fisher’s LSD comparison p < .001) or high injustice condition (M = 
5.84, SD = 1.07, LSD p < .001).  The moderate and high injustice conditions did not 
differ (LSD p = .160).  Analysis also revealed a small but significant effect of the 
power manipulation on the injustice check, F (1, 1053) = 6.94, p = .009, 2p = .01, 
although again, the expected effect was more than ten times stronger in effect size.  
There was no Power × Injustice interaction, F (2, 1053) = 0.32, p = .729, 2p = .001. 
Because the injustice manipulation varied both intentionality of action and the 
unreasoning (i.e., unprovoked) nature of the action, we also investigated our more 
specific measures of intentionality and provocation. 
Intent.  Analysis again revealed a strong effect of the injustice manipulation, 
F (2, 1056) = 270.61, p < .001, 2p = .339.  Fisher LSD post hoc tests showed that 
participants in the low injustice  (no intent) condition were perceived to have 
significantly less intent (M = 4.09, SD = 1.38) than participants in the high and 
moderate injustice conditions, which both described intentional harm to US interests 
(M = 5.72, SD = 1.03, p < .001  and M = 5.83, SD = 1.03, p < .001 respectively).  The 
moderate and high injustice conditions did not differ (p = .107).  There were also 
significant effects of the power manipulation F (1, 1056) = 58.93, p < .001, 2 = .053 
and the Power × Injustice interaction F (2, 1056) = 7.66, p < .001, 2p = .014, but as 
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with the injustice measures, these secondary effects on intent were much smaller in 
effect size. 
Provocation. Finally, we investigated appraisals of lack of provocation (that 
is, high numbers indicated lack of perceived reason for the group’s hostility).  First, it 
is important to note that the 3-item measure was not highly reliable ( = .51).  With 
that in mind, analysis revealed a significant effect of the injustice manipulation, F (2, 
1051) = 4.35, p = .013, 2p = .008, and no other effects (Power manipulation, F (1, 
1051) = 0.80, p = .371, 2p  = .001; interaction, F (2, 1051) = 1.92, p = .147, 
2
p = 
.004).  Fisher LSD post hoc analysis revealed that participants in the moderate 
injustice condition (which described provocation as a reason for the group’s hostility) 
were seen as being significantly more provoked than those in the high injustice 
condition (p = .01) and marginally more provoked than those in the low injustice 
condition (p = .09).  
Thus it appears that we successfully manipulated perceptions of power and 
injustice.  Although the manipulation checks were not fully independent, this is likely 
due in part to the very large sample size, which can make even very small effects 
statistically significant (Cohen, 1994).  Importantly, all predicted effects were 
stronger than unpredicted ones by at least a factor of ten, indicating that perceptions 
were largely affected as intended. 
We did not, however, find large differences in injustice between the moderate 
and high conditions, which varied the degree of provocation described.  While 
participants accurately judged the moderate condition’s group as having more reasons 
for their violence than the high condition, both groups were seen as equally unjust.  
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Emotions  
We next investigated how participants’ emotional reactions were affected by 
the power and injustice manipulations.  To control for shared variance in the two 
emotions, which were correlated, we conducted ANCOVAs predicting each emotion 
from the manipulations while entering the other emotion as a covariate. Descriptive 
statistics can be seen in Table 2. 
Anger. Analysis of anger revealed a significant effect of the covariate, fear F 
(1, 1052) = 688.55, p < .001, 2p = .40, as well as an effect of the injustice 
manipulation, F (2, 1052) = 27.92, p < .001, 2p = .05.  In line with the manipulation 
check findings for injustice, post hoc comparisons with LSD correction showed less 
anger in the “low” injustice condition than in the “moderate” or “high” conditions (p 
< .001) but no difference between the latter two (p = .25).  No other effects were 
significant; power main effect: F (1, 1052) = 1.79, p = .180, 2 = .002; interaction: F 
(2, 1052) = 1.73, p = .178, 2 = .003.  Thus, as expected, participants’ feelings of 
anger, controlling for fear, were affected only by injustice.   
To look internally at which components of injustice had independent 
influences on anger, we conducted a regression analysis (collapsing across condition) 
predicting anger, controlling for fear, from their appraisals of intent, provocation, 
injustice, and power.  Power was not a significant predictor (β = .01, p = .75), but 
intent (β = .23), injustice (β = .19) and (lack of) provocation (β = .19) each made 
independent contributions to anger at p < .001. 
Fear. Analysis of fear also revealed a significant effect of the covariate, anger 
F (1, 1052) = 688.55, p < .001, 2p= .40, as well as an effect of the power 
manipulation, F (1, 1052) = 23.60, p < .001, 2 = .02, such that high power groups 
evoked more fear than low power groups.  No other effects were significant (injustice: 
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F (2, 1052) = 1.69, p = .19, 2p = .003; interaction: F (2, 1052) = 2.16, p = .12, 
2
p = 
.004).  Thus, as expected, participants’ feelings of fear independently of anger were 
affected by appraisals of power, not injustice. 
Behavioral Intentions 
 To investigate the impact of the manipulations on group-level behavioral 
intentions, we submitted each measure to 2 (Power) × 3 (Injustice) ANOVAs.  Cell 
means are shown in Table 3. 
Attack. Desire to attack the threatening group was most strongly affected by 
perceptions of injustice, F (2, 1057) = 53.03, p < .001, 2p  = .09, and power, F (1, 
1057) = 75.14, p < .001, 2p  = .07.  The Injustice × Power interaction was not 
significant F (2, 1057) = 1.95, p = .143, 2p  = .004.  LSD post hoc tests showed that 
participants had a stronger desire to attack in the moderate (p < .001) and high (p < 
.001) injustice conditions than in the low injustice condition.  The moderate and high 
injustice conditions did not differ (p = .23).  Participants also had a stronger desire to 
attack the powerful group than the less powerful group.  
Avoidance. Desire to avoid the threatening group was also most strongly 
impacted by perceptions of injustice, F (2, 1057) = 61.27, p < .001, 2p  = .10, 
although it was also affected by power, F (1, 1057) = 50.83, p = .046, 2p  = .05.  
Again, the Injustice × Power interaction was not significant, F (2, 1057) = 1.86, p = 
.156, 2p  = .004.  LSD post hoc tests showed that participants had a stronger desire to 
avoid in the moderate (p < .001) and high (p < .001) injustice conditions than in the 
low injustice condition.  The two injustice conditions did not differ (p = .78).  
Participants also had a stronger desire to avoid the powerful group than the less 
powerful group. 
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Negotiation. Participants’ desire to negotiate with the threatening group was 
also affected by injustice, F (2, 1056) = 11.20, p < .001, 2p  = .021.  LSD post hoc 
tests showed that participants in the low injustice condition were significantly more 
willing to negotiate than participants in the moderate injustice condition (p = .006) 
and participants in the high injustice condition (p < .001).  This time, participants in 
the moderate and high injustice conditions differed from one another (p = .04). There 
was more desire to negotiate with the terrorist group when it had been provoked by 
the ingroup’s past transgression (moderate injustice) than when it simply hated the 
ingroup (high injustice).  Power also affected negotiation, F (1, 1056) = 16.49, p < 
.001, 2p  = .015, such that it was supported more for the high-power group.   
Overall, our manipulation of power increased the desires to negotiate, avoid, 
and attack, while our manipulation of injustice reduced the desire to negotiate, but 
increased desires to avoid and attack a threatening group.   
Relations Among Appraisals, Emotions, and Behaviors 
Regression analyses simultaneously entering all appraisals and emotions as 
predictors of each of these action tendencies across the whole study further clarified 
the most immediate influences on behavioral intentions.  
Both anger (β = .26, p < .001), and fear (β = .11, p = .002) related to increased 
desire to attack, as did intent (β =.21, p < .001) and power (β =.18, p < .001).  Anger 
again most strongly predicted avoidance (β = .35, p < .001), although fear (β = .11, p 
= .001), intent (β = .18, p < .001), injustice (β = .11, p < .001), and power (β = .14, p < 
.001) also played a role.  Finally, fear was positively related to negotiation (β = .26, p 
< .001) while intent (β = -.19), lack of provocation (β = -.23), and injustice (β = -.19), 
each had independent negative relations to negotiation, p < .001.  Anger, however, 
was unrelated to the desire to negotiate in this analysis (β = -.01, ns). 
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Finally, we carried out mediation analyses as in Experiment 1 to further 
understand how the emotions mediated between the manipulations and outcomes 
(Figure 2). The injustice manipulation was coded dichotomously, collapsing the high 
and moderate injustice conditions (which did not differ on the manipulation check) 
into one condition (coded 1) and coding the low injustice condition as 0. The power 
manipulation was coded, as before, 0 for low power and 1 for high power. These 
analyses show that although anger was a stronger mediator of the effects on both 
aggressive and avoidant intentions than fear was, the emotions did mediate uniquely 
between their respective manipulations and both outcomes; that is, the effect of power 
was significantly mediated by fear alone, and the effect of injustice by anger, 
regardless of whether aggression or avoidance was the outcome. For negotiation, the 
analyses showed that anger and fear had opposing mediating effects. While fear 
responded to the manipulated power of the group and in turn was related to increased 
support for negotiation, anger responded to the manipulated injustice of the group and 




In Experiment 2 we again found that while anger and fear were strongly 
correlated as two negative responses to threat, they also had independent relationships 
with other variables that corresponded to our predictions.  Once the two emotions 
were statistically controlled for each other’s influence, then the threatening group’s 
power uniquely influenced fear, and the intentionality of its actions uniquely 
influenced anger. 
We found only partial support for our prediction that participants would take 
into account whether a potential terrorist organization was motivated by a grievance 
against the US, or by unprovoked hatred.  In fact, the two conditions that varied this 
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factor (moderate and high injustice) showed no difference in levels of anger or 
support for harm to the group.  Importantly, however, there was more support for 
negotiation with a group if it had stated a grievance.  This may be related to a greater 
influence of the group’s reasonableness in the specific context of negotiation. 
Our regression and mediational analyses further supported the equivalence of 
aggressive and avoidant intentions, and their greater predictability from anger than 
fear, as was found in Experiment 1.  A clearer mediational picture emerged in 
Experiment 2, possibly due to the higher number of participants, to sample differences 
(UK undergraduates vs. US general population), or to differences in the measurement 
of aggression and avoidance in this study.  The strongest indirect effects on both 
aggressive and avoidant intentions involved anger in response to the injustice 
manipulations, whereas in Experiment 1 only aggressive intentions showed this 
mediation pattern.  Also, smaller but significant mediation effects showed that fear, in 
response to power manipulations, also increased both aggressive and avoidant 
intention.  
Beyond this, we found evidence linking appraisals and emotions to support for 
negotiation under threat.  Negotiation is not simply the opposite of attack, as shown 
by the effect of outgroup power, which increased both the impulse to attack and to 
compromise with the outgroup.  It seems that when people feel afraid of a threatening 
group, they want to negotiate and to a lesser extent, avoid and cause harm.  By 
contrast, perceptions of injustice increased the impulse to attack but decreased the 
desire to make a deal.  Interestingly, while the emotion of fear was related to 
increased desire to negotiate, our regression analyses showed that rejection of 
negotiation was mainly predicted by injustice and related appraisals; anger did not 
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separately predict negotiation intentions, although it did mediate between the 
manipulation of injustice and (reduced) intention to negotiate. 
We also investigated multiple kinds of information that could elicit 
perceptions of injustice from a threatening group.  Intentionality clearly had a greater 
influence on perceptions of justice than did provocation.  Because the manipulation 
check of provocation, while significant, was fairly low in reliability and weak in 
effect size, it may be that participants did not accept past exploitation by the US as a 
legitimate reason.  However, it may also be that, in the specific context where a group 
is seen as a future threat, pure intent is a much stronger cue to injustice than any 
rationale for the threat. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Across two experiments investigating reactions to terrorist threats, we found 
that the injustice underlying a perceived threat uniquely predicted the extent to which 
people felt anger toward an outgroup, whereas the threatening group’s perceived 
power predicted the extent to which people felt fear.  In spite of correlations between 
anger and fear representing a common component of general negativity felt toward 
each group, when the separate influences upon each emotion were investigated, we 
found the predicted relationships between injustice and anger, and power and fear.    
One finding that was consistently supported across both studies is that our 
manipulations of injustice had a clearer effect on broader judgments of injustice than 
on direct judgments of intentionality, even though the manipulations were based on 
descriptions that varied intentionalityIn Experiment 1  the measure of intentionality 
was only marginally affected by the injustice manipulation, and was much more 
strongly influenced by the power manipulation (see footnote 2).  In Experiment 2, we 
attempted to additionally manipulate aspects of injustice other than intentionality, but 
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found that the greatest effects of perceived injustice were due to the contrast involving 
different levels of intent, and not the contrast involving different levels of 
justification.  However, it is clear from the manipulation checks in both studies that 
varying intentionality successfully manipulated injustice perceptions.  This is 
consistent with the well established finding in the justice and morality literatures that 
perceptions of malicious intent are important in determining injustice perceptions 
(Miller, 2001) and moral blame (Shaver, 1985; Cushman, 2008).  Indeed, Experiment 
1’s questions asking about the intentionality of the group may have been interpreted 
too narrowly – of course the terrorists are literally aware of what they do in general -- 
so the measures of injustice may have done a better job of capturing the specific 
perception that the terrorists intended to single out the ingroup for harm, which we 
believe to underlie the particular aspect of threat that provokes anger. 
It might also be noted that the varied descriptions in the injustice manipulation 
happened to intensify the description of the target group’s intentions (i.e., “They … 
believe that America is evil and should be eliminated from the face of the earth.”) and 
so might be seen as raising the level of threat as well as the level of injustice.  In fact, 
as stated in the Introduction, we view acting unjustly as a form of threat in itself, 
because people who are unrestrained by justice concerns are more dangerous, so any 
“confound” between injustice and threat caused by more hostile description of the 
outgroup’s intentions is actually part of our theoretical structure.  Indeed, in 
Experiment 1, a much more restrained description of hostile intentions succeeded in 
raising the level of perceived threat as well as injustice.  Finally, because the 
manipulation successfully affected perceptions of injustice, which in turn affected 
anger even controlling for level of power perceived, we are confident that we are 
interpreting this manipulation correctly. 
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We also found that, in the context of impending menace from terrorist groups 
as opposed to a completed attack, it was principally anger that motivated both 
offensive and defensive responses aimed at preventing future attack, while fear played 
a smaller and less consistent part in both responses.  This contrasts with previous 
research on past terrorist attacks, which has found unique associations between anger 
and confrontation and fear and avoidance (see Skitka et al., 2006).  Such contrasts 
should not be unexpected, as the behaviors that are likely to functionally prevent 
attack are not identical to the behaviors that are functional in response to attack. 
Importantly, characteristics of the looming threat, in particular whether a group 
wanted to or could enact it, increased the extent to which individuals wanted to 
confront or avoid the threat.  Negotiation intentions, in contrast, were heightened 
toward groups which might be perceived as more difficult to influence (i.e., groups 
high in power) or groups who may respond to a reasonable approach (i.e. groups low 
in injustice), consistent with work from the international relations domain (see Bapat, 
2006; Pruitt, 2006). 
Although our current data only allow us to speculate on why the emotion-
action links might be different for impending versus enacted threats, one factor may 
be the uncertain nature of an impending threat.  The terrorist groups that have 
successfully attacked the United States are relatively few compared to the number that 
would like to.  Given this picture of numerous enemies who may or may not ever be 
worth noticing, it makes sense that the decision to take any action against them – 
offensive or defensive – should be motivated by a proactive, approach-oriented 
emotion such as anger.  On the other hand, fear has been analyzed on an individual 
level as an emotion that responds reactively to a definite, visible danger (Rosen & 
Schulkin, 1998); if generalized to potential threat, it becomes a more pathological 
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form of anxiety.  Therefore, it makes sense that fear’s role in promoting defensive 
action should be more pronounced when the terrorist group is associated with definite 
and visible evidence of threat. This assertion, of course, could be tested more directly 
in the future. 
It is possible that our behavioral effects may be moderated by appraisals of the 
ingroup’s strength and power.  Although a strong threatening group may elicit fear in 
any target, a strong target may be better able to respond confrontationally whereas a 
weak one may prefer an avoidance response.  This possibility may also help explain 
apparent inconsistencies between the appraisal and emotion results reported here and 
previous research.  Mackie et al. (2000), for instance, reported that the more power 
one’s own group was seen to have in comparison to a rival, the more anger; the less 
relative power one’s own group was seen to have, the more fear.  Investigating the 
interaction between perceived ingroup and outgroup power – establishing a dominant 
or equal intergroup relationship – may help clarify the apparent discrepancy.  
Although outside of our theoretical considerations for this research, another 
factor that may separate terrorism from other intergroup contexts is the nature of the 
threat posed by terrorist groups. Such threat can be seen as both realistic (e.g., 
attacking the safety and resources of the ingroup) and symbolic (e.g., undermining 
ingroup cohesion and values).  Stephan and Mealy (2011) speculate that realistic 
threats may arouse anger and fear more so than symbolic threats, which would arouse 
more morally relevant emotions such as contempt and disgust; Cottrell and Neuberg 
(2005) found that threats to values aroused both disgust and anger, while threats to 
safety aroused anger and fear.  While our research seems to have focused on emotions 
linked to realistic threat, a reasonable extension of these questions might seek to 
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identify factors rooted in symbolic threat that would activate other negative emotions 
such as disgust. 
Our findings have important implications for communication about various 
forms of threat.  First, ubiquitous reminders of terror threat levels in the news, or 
through announcements at bus stations, airports, or other public venues are likely to 
serve as constant reminders of looming threat.  When individuals focus on threats 
coming from specific groups known to harbor harmful intentions and have sufficient 
power to enact those intentions, individuals may feel both anger and fear, and may 
marginalize or harm other individuals who are even only tangentially related to a 
threatening groups (for example, by subjecting Muslims to additional security 
screening or other forms of discriminatory treatment). 
Results reported here also show that communications focusing on the power of 
threatening groups and their ability to cause harm are likely to elicit feelings of fear.  
Through the emotion of fear, they can lead to greater support for negotiation, but at 
the same time fear may also support hostile and discriminatory action against 
threatening groups.  On the other hand, communications focusing on the unjust nature 
of threatening groups are likely to elicit feelings of anger, and desires to marginalize 
or confront them, without room for negotiation.  Put together, these emotional results 
show that if the goal of terrorism is to cause concessions and capitulation through 
fear, increasing this fear does increase the desire to negotiate concessions.  But at the 
same time, if terrorist groups are seen as acting intentionally and unfairly, this 
produces anger, together with unintended side effects of increased hostile measures 
and reduced support for negotiation.  These side effects are only compounded by the 
strong correlations we found between the negative, high-arousal emotions of anger 
and fear, suggesting that to a large extent the two emotions tend to be co-activated. 
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In conclusion, these studies provide a clear model of emotional reactions to 
terrorist threat:  even when anger and fear co-occur, anger aligns itself with justice 
concerns, while fear aligns itself with concerns about the power of the group.  Our 
perspective on action readiness also suggests that the clearest division may not be 
between aggressive anger and defensive fear, but between confrontational approaches 
supported by anger, and conciliatory approaches which are positively related to fear 
but negatively related to anger.  This model, we believe, can help shed light on 
collective reactions not just to threats from terrorist groups, but from international 
crises, and from factions within society that also pose threats to the ingroup. 
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 A fifth item, “uneasy,” was originally included as part of the measure of fear, 
but factor analysis of the anger and fear items revealed clear loadings on two factors 
for all items  (predicted factor loading > .70, other loading < .40) except “uneasy” 
(fear factor loading = .51, anger factor loading =.50). Because of this empirical 
ambiguity, we excluded “uneasy” from the fear measure. 
2
 To follow up this analysis, we investigated whether participants in the high 
injustice condition perceived their group type to have more intentionality than 
participants in the low injustice condition.  This revealed a marginal effect of the 
injustice manipulation, F (1, 56) = 3.07, p = .085, 2 = .052, indicating that in general, 
participants in the high injustice condition perceived more intent in their group type 
(M = 5.28, SD = 1.10) than participants in the low injustice condition (M = 4.81, SD = 
1.12).  However, there was also a main effect of power, F (1, 56) = 10.99, p = .002, 2 
= .164, indicating that participants in the high power condition judged that their group 
type had more intentionality (M = 5.48, SD = 1.04) than participants in the low power 
condition (M = 4.60, SD = 1.04).  As expected, the interaction was not significant (p = 
.71).  This shows that while the manipulated intentionality underlying a threat was the 
principal factor influencing perceptions of justice, it was not seen as the only factor 
indicative of actual intentionality.   
3
 Alternate mediation analyses were also performed with emotion as outcome 
and action as mediator, as in Experiment 1.  These showed a number of significant 
indirect paths, as might be expected with the high power of the experiment. But 
importantly, these paths did not show the same pattern of direction and significance as 
the original mediation models.  For example, with aggression as the mediator, all four 
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indirect effects (both contrasts and both emotions) had low significant effects, with B 
= .03 or .04.  Avoidance had roughly equal significant indirect effects mediating 
between injustice and fear (B = .07) and injustice and anger (B = .10) while its role in 
the mediation of power was not significant.  Negotiation had opposite indirect effects 
as a mediator between injustice and fear (B = -.05), and power and fear (B = .04), 
whereas it did not significantly mediate any relationships involving anger.  Besides 
being difficult to interpret, these results show that no alternate model presented a full 




Table 1. Appraisals of power, injustice, intent, and provocation by condition, 
Experiment 2. 













Power M = 3.33 
SE = 0.09 
M = 3.88 
SE = 0.09 
M = 3.96 
SE = 0.09 
M = 5.03 
SE = 0.09 
M = 5.19 
SE = 0.09 
M = 5.10 
SE = 0.09 
Injustice M = 4.75 
SE = 0.08 
M = 5.67 
SE = 0.08 
M = 5.76 
SE = 0.08 
M = 4.99 
SE = 0.08 
M = 5.78 
SE = 0.08 
M = 5.92 
SE = 0.08 
Intent M = 3.63 
SE = 0.09 
M = 5.51 
SE = 0.08 
M = 5.70 
SE = 0.08 
M = 4.53 
SE = 0.08 
M = 5.93 
SE = 0.09 
M = 5.97 
SE = 0.09 
(Lack of) 
Provocation 
M = 4.69 
SE = 0.09 
M = 4.52 
SE = 0.09 
M = 4.68 
SE = 0.09 
M = 4.47 
SE = 0.08 
M = 4.45 
SE = 0.09 
M = 4.80 







Table 2. Anger and fear by condition, Experiment 2 (means adjusted with other 
emotion as covariate) 
 













Anger M = 4.31 
SE = 0.10 
M = 5.04 
SE = 0.10 
M = 5.17 
SE = 0.10 
M = 4.63 
SE = 0.09 
M = 5.07 
SE = 0.10 
M = 5.16 
SE = 0.10 
Fear M = 4.00 
SE = 0.10 
M = 4.35 
SE = 0.10 
M = 4.25 
SE = 0.10 
M = 4.63 
SE = 0.10 
M = 4.65 
SE = 0.10 
M = 4.50 




Table 3. Behavioral intentions by condition. Experiment 2 















M = 3.16 
SE = 0.11 
M = 4.35 
SE = 0.10 
M = 4.44 
SE = 0.10 
M = 4.16 
SE = 0.10 
M = 4.96 
SE = 0.11 
M = 5.04 
SE = 0.11 
Negotiate M = 3.31 
SE = 0.11 
M = 3.10 
SE = 0.11 
M = 2.81 
SE = 0.11 
M = 3.71 
SE = 0.10 
M = 3.35 
SE = 0.11 
M = 3.20 





Figure 1. Mediation analysis: emotions as mediators between injustice manipulation 
and behavioral intention outcomes, Experiment 1. Note. Unstandardized coefficients 
are shown. * = significant at p < .05 or 95% CI not including zero; m = p < .10. 
 
Figure 2. Mediation analysis: emotions as mediators between injustice manipulation 
and behavioral intention outcomes, Experiment 2. 
Note. Unstandardized coefficients are shown. * = significant at p < .05 or 95% CI not 














Note. Unstandardized coefficients are shown. * = significant at p < .05 or 95% CI not 
including zero. 
